UNITED STATES vs. WI.LLIAMSON.

RECENT 9MERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the .District Court of the United ,oStates,
Eastern -District of
Pennsylvania.
UNITED STATEq ex rel. JOHN H. WHEELE

vs. PASSMORE WILIAMSON.

1. Where the defendant in a habeas corpus makes an evasive or false return thereto,
he may be committed for a contempt, in order to compel obedience to the writ.
2. The return to a habeas corpus, denying that the persons for whose benefit the
writ is issued, are in the defendant's "custody, possession, power, or control,"
may be traversed and proved false on the hearing.
3. In a case where the relator and the defendant were citizens of different states,
a Court of the United States granted a habeas corpus, the alleged detainer being
without any authority of law, and of a purely civil nature.
4. The writ of habeas corpus may be issued on the petition of a master, whose slaves
have been taken and detained from him by force.
5. It is not material in such case that the abduction of the slaves from their master'
has taken place while the master was in bons fide transit over the soil of a state
whose laws prohibit the institution of slavery. Even if the slaves thereby became
free, it would not justify their forcible removal, without authority of law, and
against their consent and that of their master.

On the 18th day of July last the Hon. John H. Wheeler, U. S.
Minister to Nicaragua, made application to the United States Court
for this District for a writ of habeas corpus, to be directed to one
Passmore Williamson. The petition of Mr. Wheeler, verified by
affidavit, was presented by his counsel, Mr. J. C.Vandyke, District
Attorney of the United States.
The Court allowed the writ, which was made returnable forthwith, and-a hearing appointed for the following day, (the 19th) at
three o'clock in the afternoon.
On the 19th, no return being made, and it appearing that the
party to whom it was directed was absent from the city, Mr.
Wheeler's counsel applied for an alias writ, which was allowed, and
made returnable on the following morning at 10 o'clock.
On the following morning, Williamson appeared in Court, attended by his counsel, Messrs. Hopper, Gilpin and Birney, and the
following return was drawn up in the presence of the Court.
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"To the Hon. John K. Kane, the Judge within named.
"Passmore Williamson, the defendant in the within writ mentioned, for return thereto, respectfully submits, that the within
named Jane, Daniel and Isaiah, or by whatever names they may be
called, nor either of them, are not now, nor was at the time of the
issuing of the said writ, or the original writ, or at any other time,
in the custody-, power or possession of, nor confined, nor restrained
their liberty by him the said Passmore Williamson. Therefore he
cannot have the bodies of the said Jane, Daniel and Isaiah, or either
of them, before your honor, as by the within writ he is commanded.
"P.

WILLIAMSON.

"The above named Passmore Williamson being duly affirmed,
says, that the facts in the above return set forth are true.
"P.

WILLIAMSON.

"Affirmed and subscribed before me this 20th day of July, A.
D. 1855.
"CAs. F. HEAZLITT,

"U. S. Commissioner."
Mr. VANDYKE briefly stated the facts of the case, and asked leave

to traverse the return. The facts appear in the testimony taken
before the Court.
Mr. HOPPER, one of the respondent's counsel, desired time to
prepare testimony to prove the truth of the return, and asked for a
continuance, for that purpose.
The COURT could not agree to a continuance. If the facts were
as stated by the counsel for the relator, there had been a cruel outrage of a criminal nature.
Mr. GILPIN stated that the respondent wished to stand on the
ground of utter negation of the possession of the servants at any
time.
No objection on the part of the respondent being made to the
return being traversed orally, the counsel for the relator entered
upon the examination of witnesses.
John I. Wheeler, sworn.-I am a native of the State of North
Carolina, and a citizen thereof; I am the owner of three colored
persons, named Jane, Dan and Isaiah, and have been for some
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time; I hold them to labor under the laws of the State of North
Carolina and of my country; I left Washington on Wednesday, the
18th; I was under orders from my government to proceed to the
republic of Nicaragua forthwith; I have been the Minister for one
year, and had returned with a couple of treaties, and was upon my
return to take passage from New York, in company with my three
servants, whom I was taking to their mistress, who is now in
Nicaragua. My wife is a native of Philadelphia, where I married
her. I was forced to go to the residence of my father-in-law, Mr.
Thomas Sully, to get some articles of Mrs. Wheeler's. I got a
trunk from Mr. Suly's house containing these articles, proceeded
to the wharf, but found the two o'clock boat gone. I had to wait
until five o'clock for the next train. I spent the intervening time
at the nearest hotel-Bloodgood's, at Walnut street wharf.
On going on board the boat at a little before five o'clock, I retired with my three servants to the hurricane deck to get out of the
noise and bustle; shortly before five o'clock-the last bell had just
ring, at five minutes before five-while I was reading the evening
papers, an individual, whom I recognize as Mr. Passmore Williamson (looking at the respondent), came up to me and asked if he
might speak to my servants; I replied that I could not imagine
what business he could have with my servants, and that if he had
anything to say I was the proper person to say it to; Mr. Williamson then pushed past me, and asked the woman (Jane) if "she was
a slave, and if she knew she was in a free country," or something
like it, and then,. "if they (the servants) would like to be free ;" the
woman replied that she knew with whom she was going, where and
how she was going; the respondent then took her by the arm, and
began to force her away; I interfered and said to Mr. Williamson,
"I wish you would go away;" two colored fellows who had come up,
then seized and held witness, and one of them said, "if you make
any resistance I will cut your throat ;" do not know the proper
names of the negroes who seized and held me; one of them is called
"Rabbit;" by the interference of some gentleman, who seemed to
be a traveller, the negroes released me, and I hurried down to the
lower deck, and saw Williamson hurrying the woman off, and other
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colored persons with the boys, who were struggling to get away;
went up to Williamson and asked him what he was going to do with
the woman; he answered that his name was Passmore Williamson,
that he could be found at Seventh and Arch streets, and that he
would be responsible for any legal claim he (witness) might have on
the slaves. By this time the colored persons with Mr. Williamson
had got the servants off the wharf, and turning down the first street
above the wharf (Front street) hurried them into a carriage which
was standing about a square below Walnut street, in a large open
space with large warehouses in it (Dock street); after the negroes
had got off the boat, Mr. Williamson walked behind the crowd, and
said something in a whisper to a large burly policeman, who was
standing near. I spoke to the policeman in a whisper, asking him
to observe the people who were committing the outrage, but the
policeman refused to have anything to do with the matter, as "he
was not a slave-catcher."
Cross-examined.-Mr.Williamson walked back with me from the
carriage; he offered to write his name down, but I told him I could
write it myself; he gave no directions to the driver; it was not a
regular coach stand; there were no other carriages near; the people standing about the carriage, and who hurried the servants into
it, were colored.
Twomas Wallace, sworn.-I am an officer; I saw the occurrence
on the avenue, but not on the boat; a crowd was coming down
towards Dock street; I thought it was a fight, and went up; saw
several negroes forcing along a colored woman who was holding
back with all her strength, and two boys, who were also struggling;
they were all crying; four or five black fellows had the boys; they
said they were slaves, whom they were taking away; the defendant
was following the crowd; saw him do nothing but felow after the
negroes; the negroes were pushing the woman and boys along; they
all- pulled back; I followed to Dock street, and saw the negroes put
the woman and boys in a carriage; I knew the negroes; the de.
fendant whispered to me, and said that they were slaves-they were
getting away-and asked me to protect them; I said that I would
have nothing to do with the matter.
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Robert T. Tumbleston, sworn.-I am a travelling agent between
Philadelphia and New York; I was standing on the forward part of
the boat, and saw a crowd; I went forward, and saw a colored woman
and two boys being forced ashore by some colored men; I know two
of the men, Custis and Ballard, who were very busy; they said the
persons they had were slaves; Custis said to Mr. Wheeler, that if
he interfered he would cut his throat from ear to ear; Custis had
one of the boys in his arms; I followed a short distance, and then
returned.
William Edwards, sworn.-I take messages to the line and from
it; I was on the wharf when this thing occurred; I saw two boys
forced away by two colored men; the boy cried, and was struggling
very hard to get away from those who held him; there were ten or
fifteen negroes in the crowd.
Capt. Andrew Heath, sworn.-Am in the employ of the Camden
and Amboy Railroad Company; was on board the boat; saw a
negro bringing a small boy down the stairs of the boat; the boy
cried murder; there were twelve or fifteen negroes forcing the
woman and two boys along in a crowd; the boys and woman kicked
and cried to get away from their assailants; they said they wanted
to go with their master; I saw the defendant walking along with
them.
Mr. YADYxKE rose, after the above testimony had been taken,
and after remarking on the evidence and the return which had been
made by the respondent, said that he had two motions to make:1st. He moved for an attachment against the respondent, for
contempt in making a false return to the writ.
2d. That he be hel& to bail in $5,000, to answer the charge of
perjury.
Mr. GmPIDN asked whether the Court would now hear the respondent on the question of contempt. He was instructed by his client
to say, that evidence could be offered which would put a different
complexion on the case.
Judge KANE said he would either hear counsel on the question as
it now stands, or he would hear evidence for respondent.
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Mr. HOPPER said the motion of the District Attorney had taken

himself and friends by surprise, and he would ask time for consideration.
Judge KANE said he understood that the respondent was willing
to take the stand and swear that he had further evidence to offer.
If the respondent would make oath that he had such evidence in
prospect, the Court would consider the application for a continuance.
Passmore Williamson was then affiimed.-After the colored
people left Dock street, in the carriage, I saw no more of them; I
do not know where they are; have had no control over them, nor
have I had any hand in their escape; my whole connection with
the affair was this-I had heard that these three persons were in
the city, and I felt anxious to inform them of their rights; for this
purpose I went to Bloodgood's Hotel, where I saw a yellow boy; I
asked him about the matter, and he told me where the party was;
when I went upon the upper deck of the boat, I saw that man,
(pointing to Mr. Wheeler); I approached the colored woman, and
asked her if she knew her rights, that by law she was free; Mr.
W. asked me what I wanted; I told him my errand; he (Mr. W.)
kept interfering, and said she knew her rights and he did not want
any interference with his affirs; Mr. W. reminded her of her children at home, and asked her if she wanted to leave them; she
replied that she did not, but that she wanted to be free; Mr.
Wheeler insisted that the woman did not want to go; there was
an excitement, and the children cried; I saw them taken away;
the object was secured of enabling them to act in accordance with
their rights.
Question by Mr. VAYXDYKE.-Was it your object to take them
from Mr. Wheeler?
A. It was, if they desired.
Cross-examined.-William Still, a colored man, first informed
me of the matter; he laid upon my desk a note containing the
facts; I told him to go to the wharf and attend to it, that I was
going out of town; I afterwards altered my mind, and went to the
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boat; I was there before William Still; I do not know who engaged
the carriage; I don't know who had hold of Mr. Wheeler; I told
Mr. Wheeler I would be responsible to him for any damage his
rights might sustain.
Question by Mr. rA'NyKE.-Did you say his "rights," or his
"legal rights ?"
A. I do not recollect which I said. No man has rights that are
not legal rights. I told Still to get the names if he could, and if
they went to New York, we would telegraph there; he said there
was nothing in the way of their remaining here, if they wished; I
told him to hurry down to the wharf and see that their wishes were
complied with. My first idea was to get out a writ of habeas corpus
here, but as "there was no Judge in town, I thought it best to telegraph; I was afraid that as the boat was about starting, we would
not have time to accomplish anything. Still said nothing to interfere; when I went down to the boat, I saw him talking to Mr.
Wheeler; he is clerk at the Anti-Slavery office, in North Fifth
street. Still was the only person on board I knew; I saw him this
morning; we had a conversation respecting this case; we conversed
as to the safety of the party; he said they were safe, and that they
would not return under any circumstances; he did not tell me where
they were. I am Secretary of the Acting Committee of the old
Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society. Mr. Still did not tell me at
what time the party returned. I do not know who got into the carriage; I saw it drive off.
Mr. VANDYKE contended that the respondent's testimony was no
testimony at all. His statement was not sufficient to contradict the
positive evidence of disinterested witnesses. It was apparent that
these slaves were within the control of the respondent. The latter,
the District Attorney contended, had disposed of this property, and
that he could reach it, if he felt disposed.
The respondent was the ringleader in robbing the owner of his
property. He then leaves town, and this morning, early, he has a
conference with his companion in crime.
Mr. VANDYKE went on to argue that the return to the writ was
not only an evasion, but an absolute falsehood, and that the parties
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were under the control of the respondent. He urged, in conclusion, that the respondent had not purged himself of contempt, and
that he was liable for it and for perjury.
The respondent's counsel, after consultation, determined to leave
the matter to the Court for decision, without argument.
Judge KANE said, that the case was of so grave a character, and
the consequences so great to the defendant, that he was desirous,
before pronouncing an opinion, to take time to consider and examine
the matter. In the meantime, the defendant ipust enter bail in the
sum of $5,000, on the motion to hold him for perjury, to appear on
next Friday morning for a further hearing, at which time he
would deliver an opinion upon the subject. The motion for an
attachment for contempt will go over, and be disposed of at the
same time.
The Court then adjourned.
On Friday, the 27th, the Court delivered its opinion as follows:
KANE, J.-Colonel John H. Wheeler, of North Carolina, the
United States Minister to Nicaragua, was on board a steamboat, at
one of the Delaware wharves, on his way from Washington, to
embark at New York for his post of duty. Three slaves, belonging
to him, were sitting at his side on the upper deck.
Just as the last signal bell was ringing, Passmore Williamson
came up to the party-declared to the slaves that they were freeand forcibly pressing Mr. Wheeler aside, urged them to go ashore.
He was followed by some dozen or twenty negroes, who by muscular strength carried the slaves to the adjoining pier; two of the
slaves at least, if not all three, struggling to release themselves,
and protesting their wish to remain with their master; two of the
negro mob, in the meantime, grasping Col. Wheeler by the collar,
and threatening to cut his throat if he made any resistance.
The slaves were borne along to a hackney coach, that was in
waiting, and were conveyed to some place of concealment; Mr.
Williamson following, and urging forward the mob, and giving his
name and address to Colonel Wheeler, with the declaration that he
held himself responsil e towards him for whatever might be his legal
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rights; but taking no personally active part in the abduction after
he had left the dock.
I allowed a writ of habeas corus at the instance of Colonel
Wheeler, and subsequently an alias; and to this last, Mr. Williamson made return, that the persons named in ilie writ, "-nor either
of them, are not now, nor was at the time of issuing of the writ, or
the original writ, or at any other time, in the custody, power or
possession of the respondent, nor by him confined or restrained:
Wherefore lie cannot have the bodies," etc.
At the hearing, I allowed the relator to traverse this return;
and several witnesses, who were called by him, testified to the facts
as I have recited them. The District Attorney, upon this state of
facts, moved for Williamson's commitment,-lst. For contempt in
making a false return ;-2d. To take his trial for perjury.
Mr. Williamson then took the stand to purge himself of contempt. He admitted the facts substantially as in proof before;.
made it plain that lie had been an adviser of the project, and had
given it his confederate sanction throughout: He renewed his
denial that he had control at any time over the movements of the
slaves, or knew their present whereabouts. Such is the case, as it
was before me on the hearing.
I cannot look upon 'this return otherwise than as illusory-in
legal phrase, as evasive, if not false. It sets out that the alleged
prisoners are not now, and have not been since the issue of the
habeas corpus, in the custody, power or possession of the respondent; and in so far, it uses legally appropriate language for such
a return. But it goes further, and by added words, gives an interpretation to that language essentially variant from its legal import.
It denies that the prisoners were within his power, custody or
possession at any time whatever. Now, the evidence of respectable,
uncontradicted witnesses, and the admission of the respondent himself, establish the fact beyond controversy, that the prisoners were
at. one time within his power and control. iHe was the person by
whose counsel the so-called rescue was devised. He gave the directions, and hastened to the pier to stimulate and supervise their execution. He was the spokesman and first actor after arriving there.
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Of all the parties to the act of violence, he was the only white man,
the only citizen, the only individual having recognized political right,
the only person whose social training could certainly interpret either
his own duties or the rights of others under the Constitution of the
land.
It would be futile, and worse, to argue, that he who has organized
and guided, and headed a mob, to effect the abduction and imprisonment of others-he in whose presence and by whose active influence
the abduction and imprisonment have been brpught about-might
excuse himself from responsibility by the assertion that it was not
his hand that made the unlawful assault, or that he never acted as
the gaoler. He who unites with others to commit a crime, shares
with them all the legal liabilities that attend on its commission. He
chooses his company, and adopts their acts.
This is the retributive law of all concerted crimes; and its argument applies with peculiar force to those cases in which redress and
prevention of wrong are sought through the writ of habeas
corpus.
This, the great remedial process by which liberty is vindicated and
restored, tolerates no language in the response which it calls for
that can mask a subterfuge. The dearest interests of life, personal
safety, domestic peace, social repose, all that man can value, or that
is worth living for, are involved in this principle. The institutions
of society would lose more than half their value, and courts of justice become impotent for protection, if the writ of habeas corpus
could not compel the truth, full, direct, and unequivocal, in answer
to its mandate.
It will not do to say to the man whose wife or daughter has been
abducted, "I did not abduct her; she is not in my possession; I do
not detain her, inasmuch as the assault was made by the hand of
my subordinate, and I have forborne to ask where they purpose
consummating the wrong."
It is clear, then, as it seems to us, that in legal acceptance the
parties whom this writ called on Mr. Williamson to produce, were
at one time within his power and control; and his answer, so far as
it relates to his power over them, makes no distinction between that
time and the present. I cannot give a different interpretation to
his language from that which he has practically given himself, and
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cannot regard him as denying his power over the prisoner now,
when he does not aver that he has lost the power which he formerly
had.
He has thus refused, or at least he has failed, to answer to the
command of the law. He has chosen to decide for himself upon
the lawfulness as well as the moral propriety of his act, and to
withhold the ascertainment and vindication of the rights of others
from that same forum of arbitrament on which all his own rights
repose. In a word, he has put himself in contempt of the process
of this Court and challenges its action.
That action can have no alternative form. It is one too clearly
defined by ancient and honorable precedent, too indispensable to the
administration of social justice and the protection of human right,
and too potentially invoked by the special exigency of the case now
before the Court to excuse even a doubt'of my duty or an apology
for its immediate performance.
The cause was submitted to me by the learned counsel for the
respondent without argument, and I have, therefore, found myself
at some loss to understand the grounds on which, if there be any
such, they would claim the discharge of their client. Only one has
occurred to me as, perhaps, within his view, and on this I think it
right to express my opinion. I will frankly reconsider it, however,
if any future aspect of the case shall invite the review.
It is this: that the persons named in this writ as detained by the
respondent, were not legally slaves, inasmuch as they were within
the territory of Pennsylvania when they were abducted.
Waiving the inquiry, whether, for the purposes of this question,
they were within the territorial jurisdiction of Pennsylvania while
passing from one State to another upon the navigable waters of the
United States-a point on which my first impressions are adverse
to the argument-I have to say:
1. I know of no statute, either of the United States, or of Pennsylvania, or of New Jersey, the only other State that has a qualified jurisdiction over this part of the Delaware, that authorizes the
forcible abduction of any person or thing whatsoever, without claim
of property, unless in aid of legal process.
2. That I know of no statute of Pennsylvania which affects to
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divest the rights of property of a citizen of North Carolina, acquired
and asserted under the laws of that State, because he has found it
needful or convenient to pass through the territory of Pennsylvania.
3. That I am not aware that any such statute, if sucl an one
were shown, could be recognized as valid in a Court of the United
States.
4. That it seems to me altogether unimportant whether they were
slaves or not. It would be the mockery of philanthropy to assert,
that, because men had become frej, they mightitherefore be forcibly
abducted.
I have said nothing of the motives by which the respondent has
been governed. I have nothing to do with them; they may give
him support aid comfort before an infinitely high tribunal; I do
not impugn them here.
Nor do I allude, on the other hand, to those special claims upon
our hospitable courtesy which the diplomatic character of Mr.
Wheeler might seem to assert for him. I am doubtful whether the
Acts of Congress give to him and his retinue, and his property, that
protection as a representative of the sovereignty of the United
States, which they concede to all sovereignties besides. Whether,
under the general law of nations, he could not ask a broader privilege than some judicial precedents might seem to admit, is not
necessarily involved in the ca'use before me.
It is enough that I find, as the case stands now, the plain and
simple grounds of adjudication, that Mr. Williamson has not returned
truthfully and fully to the -writ of habeas corpus. He must, therefore, stand committed for a contempt of the legal process of the courrt.
As to the second motion of the District Attorney, that which
looks to a committal for perjury, I withhold an expression of opinion
in regard to it. It is unnecessary, because Mr. Williamson being
under arrest, he may be charged,t any time by the Grand Jury;
and I apprehend that there may be doubts whether the affidavit
should not be regarded as extra-judicial and voluntary.
Let Mr. Williamson, the respondent, be committed to the custody
of the Marshal without bail or mainprize, as for a contempt of the
Court in refusing to answer to the writ of habeas corpus, heretofore
awarded against him at the relation of Mr. Wheeler.

EX PARTE WILLIAMSON.

Mr. GILPIN, for the defendant, then asked leave to amend the
return so as to conform to the views of this Court.
Judge ICANE said he would give the defendant a full hearing upon
any motion his counsel would choose to present.
After the decision by the Court, the United States Marshal of
the District took the prisoner in custody, conveyed him to Moyamensing Prison, and handed him over to the keepers.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,-August,1855.1
Ex

parte PASSMOBE WILLiAiisON.

A writ of htabcar corpus cannot issue out of a state court to inquire into the cause of

a commitment for contempt by a court of the United States, by reason of any
want of jurisdiction of the latter court in the original proceeding in the course
of which the commitment was made.

After the decision in the foregoing case of United States vs.
Williamson had been pronounced, and the defendant committed for
contempt, his counsel applied to the chief justice of this court for a
writ of habeas corpus it being alleged amongst other things that
the District Court had had no jurisdiction of the original case.
The following opinion was delivered by
LmWIS, C. J.- This is an application for a writ of habeas
corpus. It appears by the copies of the warrants annexed to the
petition, that the prisoner is confined for a contempt of the District
Court of the United States in refusing to make return to a writ of
habeas corpus awarded by that court against him at the relation of
John H. Wheeler.
The counsel of Mr. Williamson very frankly stated, in answer to
an interrogatory on the subject, that they did not desire the useless
formality of issuing a writ of habeas corpus, if, on view of the cause
of detainer exhibited, I should be of opinion that the adjudication
of the U. S. District Court was conclusive. The habeas corpus act
does not require the writ to be granted in all cases whatever.

I Before L~wrs,

C. J.
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Whenever it appears upon the face of the petition, or, -which is the
same thing, by the detainer annexed to it and forming part of it,
that the prisoner is "detained upon legal process, order or warrant
for such matter or offences for which by the law the said prisoner
is not bailable," the case is excepted out of the act ; see act 18th
Feb., 1785, sec. 1.
If the "process" be "legal" and the " offence" "not bailable,"
the judge is not authorized by the statute to discharge the prisoner.
If not authorized to discharge, the law does no require the ridiculous formality of issuing the writ to bring the prisoner up, for the
purpose of remanding him back to prison. The object, as appears
from the preamble, is to relieve from "-wrongful restraints."
Where it appears from the party's own showing, that the restraint
is not "wrongful" the writ should be refused. This is the settled
construction of the English statute from which our act is taken.
3 Barn. & Ald. 420; 2 Chitty's R. 207; 3 BI. Com. 132. The
Supreme Court of the United States adopting the English construction, follows the same rule. 7 Wheat., 38; 3 Peters, 201. In like
manner, notwithstanding the letter of the act, our own Supreme
Court follows the rule of adhering to its spirit and mea ing, and
accordingly, -where a case has been already heard, upon the same
evidence, by another court, the writ will be granted or refused
according to legal discretion. -ExparteLawrence, 5 Bin. 304.
We come, therefore, at once to the cause of detainer. Is it a
"legal process, order or warrant for an offence which by law is not
bailable ?" Mr. Justice Blackstone in Brass Orosby's case, 3 Wilson, 188, declared that "all courts ai'e uncontrolled in matters of
contempt. The sole adjudication of contempts, and the punishment
thereof in any manner, belongs exclusively, and without inte~fering,
to each respective Court. Infinite confusion and disorder would
follow if courts could by writ of habeas corpus examine and determine the contempts of others. This power to commit, results 'from
the first principles of justice; for if they have the power to decide
they ought to have the power to punish." "It would occasion the
utmost confusion if every court of this hall should have power
to examine the commitments of the other courts of the hall for contempts; so that the judgment and commitment of each respective
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court, as to contempts, must befinal and without control." 3 Wilson, 204. This doctrine was fully recognized by the Court of Common Pleas of England, in the case referred to. It has since been
approved of in numerous other cases, in that country and in this.
In exparte Kearney, 7 Wheaton, 38, it was affirmed by the Supreme Court of United States, in accordance with the decision in
Brass Crosby's case, 3 Wilson, 188, that "when a court commits
a, party for contempt their adjudication is a conviction, and their
commitment in consequence is execution." 7 Wheaton, 38; 5
Cond. R., 227. In the case last cited, it was also expressly decided
that "a writ of habeas corpus was not deemed a proper remedy
where a party was cQmmitted for a contempt by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that if granted, the court would not inquire
into the cause of commitment." 7 Wheaton, 38. Many authorities to the same effect are cited by Chief Justice Cranch, in .Nugent's
case, 1 American Law Journal, (N. S.) 111.
But it is alleged that the District Court had no jurisdiction. It
does not appear that its jurisdiction was questioned on the hearing
before it. The act of Congress of 24th September, 1789, gives it
power to issue "writs of habeas corpus which may be necessary for
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and agreeably to the principles and
usages of law;" and the same act expressly authorizes the judge of
that court to grant writs of habeas corpus "for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment; provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to persons in jail, unless where they are in
custody under the authority of the United States or committed for
trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought
into court to testify." Other acts of Congress give the United States
Judges jurisdiction in writs of habeas corpus in cases therein specified. It does not appear that the writ issued for persons in jail, or
in disregard of state process or state authority. It may be that in
an action at law, where the judgment of a United States Court is
relied on as a justification, the jurisdiction should be affirmatively
shown. But in a writ of habeas corpus, issued by a judge having
no appellate power over the tribunal whose judgment is shown as
the cause of detainer, where the jurisdiction of the latter depends
upon the existence of certain facts, the record being silent in regard
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to them, and no objections to its authority are made on the hearing,
the jurisdiction ought to be presumed, as against. the party who
might have raised the question at the proper time, but failed to do
so. It is true, that if the jurisdiction be not alleged in the proceedings, the judgments and decrees of the United States Courts are
erroneous, and may, upon writ of error or appeal, be reversed for
that cause. But they are not absolute nullities. If other parties
who had no opportunity to object to their proceeding, and who
could not have writs of error, may regard theig as nullities, it does
not follow that the parties themselves may so treat them. lKempe's
Lessee vs. Kennedy, 5 Cr. 183 ; Skillern's .Ex'rvs. Hay's .Ev'r, 6
Cranch, 267; McCormick vs. Sullivant, 10 Wheat., 192.
It is alleged that the right of property cannot be determined on
habeas corpus. It is true that the habeas corpus act was not intended to decide rights of property, but the writ at common law
may be issued to deliver an infant to a parent, or an apprentice to
a master. Com. vs. Bobinson, 1 S. & R., 853. On the same
principle, I see no reason why the writ at common law may not be
used to deliver a slave from illegal restraint, and restore him to the
custody of his master. But granting, for the purpose of the argument, (which I am far from intimating,) that the district judge made
an improper use of the writ,-that he erred in deciding that the
prisoner refused to answer it,-that he also erred in the construction of the return which was made, and that he otherwise violated
the rights of the prisoner, it is certainly not in my power to reverse
his decision. lie had clearly jurisdiction to try and punish contempts committed in the presence of the court, or by parties in
disobeying its writs, process, orders, or decrees. See Act of Congress of March 2, 1831. If the Court had no jurisdiction of the
writ of habeas corpus, that was merely matter of defence, to be
urged on the trial of the charge of contempt. It touched not in
the least the jurisdiction to try and punish for that offence.
If a writ of habeas corpus had issued from a state Court to the
United States Marshal, and that court had adjudicated that the
r. hal was guilty of a contempt in refusing to answer it, and had
committed him to prison, the District Court of the United States
would have no power to reverse that decision, or to release the Mar-
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shal from imprisonment. No court would tolerate such an interference with its judgments. The respect which we claim for our
own adjudications, we cheerfully extend to those of other courts
within their respective jurisdictions.
For these reasons the writ of habeas corpus is refused'

In the District Court of the United States, Northern District of
2
California.
CRUZ CERVANTES VS. THE UNITED STATES.
1. A grant by the Political Chief for the time being of Alta California, was not
invalid, though it did not receive the previous approbation of the Territorial
Deputation. The grant conveyed a present and immediate interest, and the neglect to obtain such approbation, if it were the duty of the grantee at all, would
have been only the breach of a condition subsequent, by which the title was not
forfeited.
2. In the same manner, conditions in such a grant, that the grantee should build
and inhabit a house within a certain time, and also obtain judicial possession of
the land, are conditions subsequent; and where, in a particular case, after the
time limited, the grantee actually took possession of the premises, and had lived
on them and cultivated them for three years, when he obtained judicial possession,
which lie maintained till the time of suit, a period of twelve years, it was held
that the title had not been forfeited.
3. It isalso no objection to such a grant (made in Pf-1) that the lands c.mprebonded by it were within the limits of a mission.
4. It is, finally, no objection to such a grant, that the land was within ten leagues
of the sea-coast, and that the approbation of the Supreme Execntive did not
appear to have been obtained.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-" The Board of Commissioners to ascertain
and settle the private land claims in the State of California,"
decided in favor of the validity of the claim of the appellant, from
which decision the United States appealed to this Court, by whom
the decree of the said Board of Commissioners was reversed, and a
decree entered declaring the claim of the present appellant to be
McALLISTER,
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invalid. From this last decision an appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States, by whom it has been remanded
to this tribunal with instructions to permit certain amendments to
be made in the pleadings. See Cervantes vs. United States, 16
How. 619.
It now comes before us for decision on its merits, with the lights
which have been shed upon some of the principles embodied in it
by the decisions made by the Supreme Court in the recent cases of
Fremont vs. The United States, and the Unitpd States vs. Bitelde.
From the evidence in this cause it appears, that the appellant
having complied with all the provisions of the Mexican Government
relating to colonization, obtained a grant from Don Nicolas Gutierrez, dated April 1st, 1836, in these words:
"Nicolas Gutierrcz, Lieutenant Colonel of the permanent Cavalry, Commandant General, Inspector and Superior Political Chief
ad interim of the Territory of Alta California. Whereas, Citizen
Cruz Cervantes, a MIexican by birth, has applied, for his own
benefit and that of his family, for the parcel of land known by the
name of San Joaquin, bounded on the north by San Felipe, on the
south by Santa Anna, on the west by the plain of San Juan, and
on the east by the hills of the same name; and whereas, all the
requirements of the laws and regulations in the matter have been
complied with; now, by virtue of the authority in me vested, I have
thought proper, by a decree of this day's date, and in the name of
the Mexican nation, to grant to him the aforementioned parcel of
land, declaring the same to be his property by these letters patent,
subject to the approval of the excellent deputation and the following
conditions:
"1st. He will submit to such conditions as shall be made by the
regulations hereafter to be made for the distribution of vacant lands,
and that meanwhile neither the grantee nor his heirs shall divide or
alienate that which is adjudicated them, nor shall they subject it to
rent, entail, bond, mortgage, nor to any incumbrance whatever, even
if it should be for charitable purposes, nor convey it into mortmain.
"2d. He may fence it without obstructing crossings, roads, and
servitudes, putting it to such use and culture as he may deem best,
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but within one year at farthest he shall build thereon a house and
shall inhabit it.
"3d. He shall solicit of the respective judge to give him judicial
possession by virtue of this patent, by whom the boundaries shall
be marked, at the limits of which, besides the landmarks, there shall
be set some fruit trees or else wild ones of some usefulness.
"4th. The land of which donation is made is of two sitios de
ganado mayor (two square leagues) according to the plat annexed
to the proceedings. The judge who may give possession will cause
it to be measured agreeably to ordinance, leaving the excess,
(sobrante) which may result to the nation for its purposes as may
be deemed convenient.
".5th. If he shall contravene these conditions he shall lose his
right to the land, and it may be denounced by any other person.
"Wherefore I command, that holding this as a firm and valid
title, the same be entered in the corresponding book, and be returned to the interested party for his own security and further
ends.
"Given in Monterey on the 1st of April, 1836.
NICOLAS GUTIERREZ.
"K

"I-F'co del Castillo Negrete, S'rio."
The parol evidence in the cause shows that Cervantes was living
on and cultivating the premises "about two years after the revolulution between Governor Chico and Gutierrez." This, then, must
have been some time in 1838. Another witness deposes to the
appellant's living on the premises in 1846, and "that the house
looked to be several years ol," and the continued occupation by
him and cultivation of the premises down to the present time, is
established. The genuineness of the grant and all preceding documents on which it is ;redicated is not disputed.
The objections to the claim are:
1st. That the grant had not received the approval of the Territorial Deputation.
2d. That a house was not built within the time prescribed by the
grant, nor judicial possession applied for.
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3d. That the land belonged to a Mission, and could not be
granted.
4th. That the lands being within ten leagues of the sea coast,
were not subject to colonization.
A reference to the first and immediately succeeding articles of
the General Regulations of 21st November, 1828, for the colonization of Mexican territories, of which Upper Colifornia was one,
will show the power of granting lands was confined to the political
chiefs of those territories. True it is, that by the fifth article, it is
declared that the grants made "shall not be definitely valid without
the previous approbation of the Departmental Assembly, to which
the respective expedientes shall be referred." If this article treats
the grant as void until such consent shall have been obtained, then
is the granting power transferred from the Political Chief to the
territorial deputation, for it would be their approval and not his
grant, which conveyed an interest in the land. But the article
itself does not consider the grant void without such approval, for in
case such approval is not obtained by the political chief, it is made
his duty by the sixth article, "to report to the Supreme Goverr.ment with the record of the case for its resolution." Intermediate
the issuing of the grant, and the approval of the Departmental Assembly, and, that if that could not be obtained, the promulgation of
the Resolution of the Supreme Government, the grant is declared
to be not definitiveZy-valid. It is then at least inceptively validbut to what extent, as the Regulations are silent, we must look to
the grant itself, the construction placed upon it by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and the well established usage of the
country for an answer.
In the case of Frernontvs. -The United States, 17 How. 542, and
in that of The United States vs. Bitchie, Id.525, grants similar to
that under consideration were reviewed by the Supreme Court.
That tribunal declared in the former case, that the words of such
grant "were positive and plain ;" they purport to "convey a present and immediate interest." Now the consent of the territorial
delegation could not vary the character of the grant. Passing by
its terms, a "present and immediate interest," it presents the ordi-
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nary case of an estate or interest conveyed to the 'grantee detcrminable on the happening of a future event. The usage of the
country also established this interpretation of the grant. One of
the witnesses inthe case, E. P. lIartnell, deposes, he has resi'led
thirty years in California, has filled the offices of Inspector General
to the Missions, Collector of the Port of Monterey, Translator to
the Military Government of California, and is now State Translator; is well acquainted with the usages and customs which prevailed for eleven or twelve years prior to the acquisition of the
country by the Americans, in relation to the granting of lands.
ie states the usage was for the grantee upon receiving the Governor's grant, to consider himself entitled to enter into the granted
premises, and so far from having to wait for judicial possession or
the approval of the deputation, "I have known, (he says,) numerous
it/stances in which neither the one nor the other was asked for many
years." He further deposes, "it was always considered the duty
of the Governor to do that, (to obtain the approval of the Assembly,) and I know, from my own knowledge, that whilst the deputation was held at Monterey, the Governor always did so. I never
knew of any grantee interesting himself about getting the approval
of his title, until it was rumored that the Americans were coming
to take possession of the country." On his cross-examination be is
equally explicit as to the usage and the general opinion of the
inhabitants as to its existence. Viewed then, as the grant has been
construed by the Supreme Court, or as it has been interpreted by
the well established usage in California, during the Mexican rule,
the Court considers that the failure of appellant to procure the
approval of the Departmental Assembly, if it is to be deeined his
duty so to have done, was the breach of a condition subsequent, for
which the title of appellant cannot be forfeited.
The omission of appellant to build a house within the time prescribed by the grant, and to obtain judicial possession of the land,
are clearly conditions subsequent. It has been urged, that the
eleventh article of the General Regulations declares the grant to
be "null and void," in case of a failure to occupy and cultivate.
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But this section applies exclusively to pobladores, (settlers or
colonists,) who shall have failed to cultivate the lands on the terms
and with the number of persons or families agreed on. In such
cases only, is the grant declared "null and void," and even in
such cases the political chief is authorized to confirm the same in
proportion to the part of the agreeriient fulfilled.
The conditions then, to build a house within the time prescribed
by the grant, and to obtain judicial possession of the premises being
conditions subsequent, the breach of both or Oither of them cannot
operate, under the facts of the case, a forfeiture cf appellant's title.
Arredondo's case, 6 Peters, 729. Fremont vs. The United States,
17 How. 542.
The third objection to the validity of this claim is, that the lands
granted were what are generally termed "Mission lands," and
therefore not subject to colonization. This objection we deem to
have been disposed of by the Supreme Court, U. S., in the case of
The United States vs. Ritchie, 17 How. 525, in which it was
decided not to be available.
The last ground taken against the appellant is, that the lands
granted to him are situated within ten leagues of the sea shore,
and therefore not the subject of grant without the previous approbation of the Supreme Executive Power.
"The principle, (say the Supreme Court,) which prevails as to
all public grants of land, dr acts of public officers in issuing warrants, &c., is, that the public acts of public officers, purporting to
be exercised in an official capacity and by public authority, shall
not be presumed to be a usurped, but a legitimate authority previously given, or subsequently ratified, which is equivalent."
It is a universal principle, where power or jurisdiction "is delegated to any public officer or tribunal, over a subject matter, and
the exercise is confided to his or their discretion, the acts so done
are binding and valid as to the subject matter." Arredondo's
case, 6 Peters, 729. In United States vs. Clarke, 8 Peters, 453,
the Court say, "He who would contravene a grant executed by the
lawful authority, with all the solemnities required by law, takes
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upon himself the burthen of showing that the officer has transcended the powers conferred upon him, or that the transaction is
tainted with fraud."
The principle under consideration, was extended to a case where
a grant was issued by a Governor of East Florida, reciting a royal
ordinance which authorized the issuing of grants toforeigners, for
the consideration therein mentioned; but the grant proceeded to
concede lands to a citizen, for a consideration totally different from
that mentioned in the ordinance. The Court in such case, say,
"although the order is recited, it (the grant,) does not prefess to
be founded upon it." This is apparent, (the Court say,) from the
fact that the land is granted to a citizen, and for a consideration
entirely different from that mentioned in the ordinance, and although
the ordinance is recited in the grant, the Court proceed to predicate
the power to make it upon the decree made by the Governor on 3d
April preceding. To sustain his power to make such decree and
grant, they enter into a general consideration of the Spanish laws,
and after enunciating the general principle, "that a grant made by
a Governor, if authorized to grant lands in his province, is prima
facie evidence that his power is not exceeded," they state that the
connection between the Crown and the Governor justifies the presumption that he acts according to his orders. His orders are
"known to himself and to those from whom they proceed, but may
not be known to the world. Such a grant, under a general power,
would be considered as valid, even if the power to disavow it existed,
until actually disavowed. It can scarcely be doubted, that in a
Spanish tribunal, a grant having all the forms and sanctions required by law, not actually annulled by superior authority, would
be received as evidence of title." 8 Peters, 451.
We do not consider the relative position between the king and
a governor, under the Spanish rule, unlike that which existed between the executive and the territorial chief, under the Mexican
r6gime, as to absolutism on the one hand, and dependence on the
other. It is upon such presumed relation, the Supreme Court rests
its argument to some extent in the case cited, and sustains the
grant.
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the argument against the validity of appellant's grant L-,
that the lands covered by it are within ten leagues of the sea coast,
and without the previous approbation of the Supreme Executive
power of Mexico, could not be granted. The general power to grant
is not denied ; but it is asserted that these specific lands were excepted from the granting power; and the 4th article of the colonization law of the 18th August, 1824, is relied on. For the present
it may be admitted, that such is the clear import of that article, and
the first reply to it is, that four years subseiluently, in the year
1828, the Supreme Executive power did give its approbation as required. The act of 1824 did not express the form in which such
consent was to be given. That was left to the discreton of the
executive.
In 1828 the general regulations for the colonization of the territories of the Republic were announced by the Supreme Executive
power. ]By the first article the power to "grant vacant lands generally within their respective territories," was delegated to the poitical chief. There is no limitation in terms as to vacant lands,
within ten leagues of the sea coast ; but there is a reference to a
class of lands, a portion of which is well known to lie within the ten
littoral leagues, and that reference is to b'e fouid in the 17th article,
where it is provided that mission lands are not to be colonized, not'
because of their vicinity to the coast, but because it was yet to be
determined by the government whether they were to be considered
the property of neophytes, catechumans, and of Mexican settlers.
It is natural to suppose, that in the settlement of a new country,
with a savage foe in the interior, with the ecclesiastical and military
establishments on the coast, and a sparse population struggling into
existence, that the lands first petitioned for, should be those immediately on the coast, affording safety from hostile attacks in the
rear, and in front the means of escape in the hour of necessity.
In truth the very object of the law, (the settlement of families
and cultivation of the soil,) could only be effected by primarily reclaiming the frontier lands on the coast. Acbordingly, the political
chiefs-not one, but all-proceeded, to grant vacant lands without
distinction. It has been well argued by the board of commissioners
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in this case, "1that one political chief or governor, might have erred
in the matter through ignorance, or from some improper motive,
and ,oof one body of the deputation or junta; but that all should
have done so through a series of years, and successions of terms, it
is difficult to believe; and the evidence of this construction is
heightented to the highest degree of moral and legal certainty by
the acquiescence of the executive, after we must presume he had
knowledge of this construction of his regulations, and never intimating, as far as we can learn, that there was any error in this uniform course of proceeding. His knowledge of all this is a presumption of law, fron the requirement of quarterly returns to be made
to him of all the grants that were made and the facts relating to
them,' 'th1article, general regulation, 1828. In this case there
was no fraud on part of appellant; no mistake on the part of the
political elief. The former, in his first petition for a grant, gives
the boundaries of the land, and in his second reiterates them, accolupanying such petition with a map; and the proper functionary
to whom thie petition was referred, reported the land to be within
the tin littoral leagues mentioned in the law of August 18th, 1824,
and the report concludes "that the land may be granted to petitioner if the mission of San Juan Bautista, to whom it belongs has
no oljection." In face of the fact that the lands proposed to be
granted were reported by the appropriate functionary to be within
the ten litt, ral leagues, the governor proceeded to grant them. All
other political chiefs before and since his time have exercised like
power. All the IMoexican functionaries recognized it-the most
valiale portions of land were granted under its exercise, and the
people of the territories acted upon it. Property conveyed under
it passed from one to another by operation of law, and by act of the
parties for years-all acted upon the belief of the right of the governors to grant, and of the correctness of the interpretation placed
by them on til regulations. The usage and custom was well established, and the community to a considerable extent was built up
under its operation. The Supreme Court have said "1there., is
another source of law in all governments :-usage, custom, which is
always to be presumed to have been adopted with the consent of
48
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those who may be affected by it. The court not only may, but are
bound to respect general customs and usages as the law of the land
equally with the written law, and when clearly proved they will
control the general law."
"We cannot impute to Congress the intention to not only authorize this court, but to require it, to take jurisdiction of such a case,
and to hear and determine such a claim according to the principles
of justice, by such a solemn mockery of it as would be evinced by
excluding from our consideration, usages and ,customs, which are
the law of every government, for no other reason than in referring
to the laws and ordinances in the second section, Congress had not
enumerated all the kinds of laws and ordinance§ by which we should
decide, whether the claim would be valid if the province had remained under the dominion of Spain." Arredondo's case.
This court consider that the exception sought to be established in
this case to the general power of granting by the political chiefs, is
not clearly made out against the legal presumption which exists in
favor of a grant on a fair interprethion of the phraseology of the
general regulations of 1828, and the well established usage of the
Mexican local authorities, acquiesced in for a series of years by the
Supreme Executive power. Opposed to all these, is a verbal criticism upon two articles of the regulations of 1828, in connection
with the 4th article of the Colinization Act of Mexico, 18th August,
1824.
The first act of the regulations, it is argued, authorizes the political chiefs to grant only in conformity to the act of the 18th August, 1824, and the third article directs the political chiefs to ascertain whether the requirements of that act are embraced in the petition,
and whether the petitioner, as well as the land, possess the requisite
conditions. Now, the act of colonization contained general provisions, which were designed to control the new system Mexico had
recently adopted, and doubtless the general regulations of 1828
were intended to carry out the policy of that act. Among other
provisions, it extended to all colonists certain guaranties-restricted
the quantity of lands to be held by one person, directed certain distinctions to be made in the selection of grantees, and reserved to
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the government the right to take precautions, in certain cases
against foreigners.
The reference to that act by the regulations of 1828, may be regarded as simply adopting its general policy. The direction in the
third act of the general regulations to the political chiefs to ascertain if the requirements of the law *ere embraced in the petition,
and the persons as well as the land, possessed the requisite conditions, are but a repetition of the words in the first article, with the
additional direction that lie should ascertain if the persons who
petitioned, if foreigners, applied with a view to settle in the country-if citizens, to live on and cultivate the soil, and that the land
petitioned for was "vacant," such being requisite conditions of persons and land coming within the purview of the regulations themselves.
But if this interpretation be deemed equivocal, and not a clear
exposition of the intention to be gathered from the colonization act
of 1824, and the general regulations of 1828, we consider there is
such doubt on this point, that it cannot be successfully urged to defeat the claim of the appellant acquired under the interpretation of
the granting power by all the political chiefs and lesser functionaries of the Mexican government, acquiesced in for years by the
Supreme Executive power sanctioned by well established usage, and
had thus become a rule of property under which large amounts of
property have been acquired, held, and transferred during the exist,ence of Mexican rule in California.
It has been strongly argued by counsel for the appellant that the
colonization act of 1824 applies exclusively to foreign colonists, and
is applicable to the States only, and does not extend to the territories of the Republic. In the view taken of this case, it is deemed
unnecessary to discuss these questions.
In this case the evidence clearly establishes the fact that at no
time did the appellant abandon his claim. Within two years after
receiving his grant he took actual possession of the premises, and
lived on and cultivated them until 1841, when the Mexican authorities placed him injudicial possession, which he maintained until the
acquisition of Mexico by that country.
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It is true he did not attain judical possession until some five years
after the date of his grant, but subsequently in 1841 he did obtain
from the authorities such possession and has continued to hold under
it to the present time. Under these circumstances, we consider
that his claim is to be held valid by the rules prescribed for our guidance in the adjudication of this and similar cases.
It is therefore hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the decision and decree of the IBoard of Commissioners for the ascertainment and settlement of private land claims is California made in
this ease be confirmed, and that the claim of the appellant, Cruz
Cervantes, be, and the same is hereby confirmed to the extent of
two square leagues, or sitios de ganado mayor, and for no more;
being the same land described in the grant and expediente referred
to therein, and of which judicial possession was given to him as appears by the evidence, provided that the said quantity to him
granted, and now to him confirmed, be contained within the boundaries called for in said grant, and map to which the grant refers;
and, if there be less than two square leagues, or sitios de ganado
mayor, within the said bounds then there is confirmed to him the
said less quantity.

RECENT FRENCH

DECISION.

Tri6unal Civil de la Seine, (4me CJiambre.)
BOYLE vs. GONDO.1 AND BARRIER.'
No one but the party to whom a letter is addressed, or its author, has the right to
demand its production, even for the purposes of a judicial investigation. Therefore, where one who had brought a civil action in England, for a libel contained
in a letter first published in a French journal, applied to a Court *in France to
compel the production of the letter by the editors of the journal, for the purpose
of enabling him to use it on the trial in England, it was held that this could not
be done without the consent of the author of the letter.

The circumstances out of which this case arose are as follows.
The complainant, the Rev. Richard Boyle, a Roman Catholic
The following report, except so much of the preliminary statement as bears on
the proceedings in England, is takeu from the .Tournal des Debals of Aug. 7, 1855.
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priest, brought an action of libel, in England, against Cardinal
Wiseman, a well known prelate of the Roman Catholic Church, for
certain statements contained in a letter, first published in a French
newspaper, l' Univers, on the 23d March, 1854, and afterwards in
two English papers, the Catlolic Standard, and the Tablet. On
the first trial of the case the plaintiff was nonsuited, on the ground
that he had failed to prove publication. The Court of Exchequer,
however, granted a new trial in the case, because of a refusal of the
judge at nisi prius to permit the defendant to be called to the stand
as a witness, under the 14 and 15 Vict. c. 99. Another point in
the case, was the rejection by the judge, of evidence of the contents
of a letter written by the defendant, admitting the authorship of
the one in question, which letter was in the possession of a person
beyond the jurisdiction, and who refused to produce it. The Court,
while appearing to agree that, where every reasonable effort to procure the document had been made in such a case, a resort to
secondary evidence would be allowed, yet held that a mere demand
of the letter by a stranger, of the holder, who did not disclose his
object in making it, did not come within the category. Boyle vs.
Wisernan, 24 Law Journ. Excheq. 160; 1 Jur. N. S. 115.
The case came on for trial again in
1855, when a verdict
was found for the plaintiff for £1000. The defendant then, in his
turn, moved for a new trial, which upon argument in the Court of
Exchequer, was granted, on the ground of improper rejection of
evidence for the defendant. See 19 Jurist, part ii, p. 246.' In
order to enable him to procure the evidence deemed necessary by
the English Courts, Mr. Boyle now brought the present suit in
Tribunal Civil de la Seine, against M. Jules Gondom, editor of
1'Univers, and MI.Barrier, publisher of that journal, for the delivery up of the original of the letter published in its columns on the
2-3d of May, 1854, bearing the signature of Cardinal Wiseman.
The complainant also asked for damages, in case of refusal.
In a recent number of the London Times, we observe that this hardly fought case
of Boyle rs. Wiseman, has been compromised. The defendant Wa to pay the costs,
esxcept of the second trial, a part of which only he %7,sto assume, which amounted
in all to about £1'.i.

No apology or r'taction was to be made.
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31_e. ITenry Cellier, for Boyle, after calling attention to the fcts,
continued :-M. Jules Gondom, who professes to have received this
letter, and M. Barrier, who has published it, cannot refu,-e the Rev.
Mr. Boyle the means of establishing the truth with regard to it;
otherwise we would have the right to insist that they adopt the
whole responsibility of the publication, and even that they are
guilty of fabricating an apocryphal letter; in either of which cases
Mr. Boyle would be entitled to bring his action for damages against
them. Acting on this view of the law, on the lpth of February last,
he summoned them to produce the letter to him, informing them that
his solicitor, Mr. Sherman, would call the next day at the office of the
journal, accompanied by witnesses, to receive it. On the 20th, accordingly, that visit was made, but M. Jules Gondom avoided appearing, and M. Barrier declined to produce the letter. Mr. Boyle has,
therefore, the right to his action by reason of this refusal, which is
opposed to a lawful demand, and which prevents his obtaining
justice elsewhere.
111e. Templier, on the part of Gondom and Barrier, thus replied
to these arguments :-The right of demanding the delivery of a
letter, or its deposit in the hands of a third person for a particular
purpose, can belong only to the author, or to the party to whom it
is addressed. These gentlemen cannot honorably accede to a demand whose object is to injure their correspondent, and to aggravate the position, in itself a difficult one, of a Catholic priest before
a Protestant jury. Mr. Boyle ought, therefore, to be refused his
claim. They do not desire, at present, and so far as is necessary,
to interpose any personal exception, or to resist his receiving an
official certificate to that effect ; on the contrary, they are ready to
make the required production, provided Mr. Boyle procures a regular authority to that effect from the Cardinal.
The COURT DECREED as follows:
Considering that to justify a demand for the production of a
docum-en,'
!not sufficient for the party to allege an interest in
its use; but he must T:ther establish a title to the document
itself.

